TECHNIQUE
Agentic Orchestration
Observed practice: operators keep human checkpoints around agent outputs that become production changes, PR changes, governance approvals, or published incident artifacts.
Require a platform-team review before a new AI use case is onboarded: Grab uses a mini-RFC and checklist for every new use case.
1 of 5 observed operators with cited human-checkpoint evidence.Keep human approval before production deployment of generated security changes.
1 of 5 observed operators with cited human-checkpoint evidence.Route AI-generated code fixes or optimization suggestions through developer review / PR workflows rather than applying them silently.
2 of 5 observed operators with cited human-checkpoint evidence.Validate AI-drafted incident/report content with a human reviewer before publishing internally.
1 of 5 observed operators with cited human-checkpoint evidence.Escalate to human review when the LLM lacks full context, such as prior alerts or historical signals.
1 of 5 observed operators with cited human-checkpoint evidence.Use automated validation or falsification before the human checkpoint to reduce low-quality outputs reaching reviewers.
3 of 5 observed operators with cited human-checkpoint evidence.Across the cited deployments, human checkpoints are retained around durable or high-impact outcomes: use-case onboarding, production security changes, PR/code changes, or published incident documentation.
Operators place the human checkpoint at different stages of the workflow.
APPROACH 01
Upfront governance gate before a use case is onboarded.
APPROACH 02
Approval gate before deploying generated security changes to production.
APPROACH 03
PR or developer-review checkpoint for AI-generated code fixes and optimization findings.
APPROACH 04
Post-generation reviewer validation before publishing an AI-drafted incident report.
Operators differ on whether human involvement is mandatory for every item or conditional on uncertainty / interaction.
APPROACH 01
Mandatory review or approval is built into the workflow.
APPROACH 02
Human review is used as a fallback when context is insufficient.
APPROACH 03
Humans can invoke the agent from the PR thread to request a change.
False positives, hallucinations, and weak findings are recurring reasons for validation before or alongside human checkpoints.
Insufficient context is explicitly treated as a reason to avoid autonomous resolution and route to people or further verification.
For production/security-sensitive changes, operators do not present the agent as the final authority; approval remains a human checkpoint.
| Name | Kind | When | Maturity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Approval queue with resumable state | pattern | high-stakes actions pause for human sign-off and resume exactly where they stopped | established |
| LangGraph interrupts | library | graph-native pause/resume already running on LangGraph | established |
| Temporal signals | service | human input arrives asynchronously into long-lived durable workflows | established |